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INTRODUCTION
The complex relationship between Emerson's philosophy and Melville's vision as
portrayed in his fictional texts is a reflection of Melville's ambivalent response to
Emerson as recorded in his correspondence with Duyckinck. In a letter dated February
24th, 1849, Melville writes positively about Emerson: "I have heard Emerson since I have
been here. Say what they will, he's a great man" (Correspondence 119). Distinguishing
himself from the Transcendentalists, Melville continues his praise for the philosopher on
March 3, 1849:
Nay, I do not oscillate in Emerson's rainbow, but prefer rather to hang
myself in mine own halter than swing in any other man's swing. Yet I
think Emerson is more than a brilliant fellow. . . I was very agreeably
disappointed in Mr. Emerson. I had heard of him as full of
transcendentalisms, myths & oracular gibberish; I had only glanced at a
book of his once in Putnam's store—that was all I knew of him, till I heard
him lecture.—To my surprise, I found him quite intelligible, tho' to say
truth, they told me that that night he was unusually plain.—Now, there is a
something about every man elevated above mediocrity, which is, for the
most part, instinctuly [sic] perceptible. This I see in Mr. Emerson. And
frankly, for the sake of the argument, let us call him a fool; —then had I

rather be a fool than a wise man. —I love all men who dive.
(<Correspondence 121)
Despite this praise of Emerson, in the same letter to Duyckinck, Melville criticizes him
for his arrogance:
I could readily see in Emerson, notwithstanding his merit, a gaping flaw.
It was, the insinuation, that had he lived in those days when the world was
made, he might have offered some valuable suggestions. These men are
all cracked right across the bow. And never will the pullers-down be able
to cope with the builders-up. And this pulling down is easy enough—a
keg of powder blew up Block's Monument—but the man who applied the
match, could not, alone, build such a pile to save his soul from the sharkmaw of the Devil. (Correspondence 121-22)
Melville's criticism of Emerson as a "builder-up" is a critique of those who assign
spiritual meaning to the world from the human perspective, as opposed to the "pullersdown" (like Melville), who accept the meaning of the world as it descends from God and
appears to human beings. The "builders-up" tend to dismiss evil as a force in the world,
and only assign benign significance to the universe. Melville equates Emerson with the
original "builder-up," Plato: "But enough of this Plato who talks thro' his nose." He
criticizes transcendentalism as a system as flawed as Platonic idealism. Finally, Melville
points out Emerson's disengagement with fellow human beings and criticizes him as anti¬
social: "You complain that Emerson tho' a denizen of the land of gingerbread, is above
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munching a plain cake in company of jolly fellows, & swinging off his ale like you & me.
Ah, my dear sir, that's his misfortune, not his fault" (Correspondence 122). Melville's
appreciation of Emerson as a diver and criticism of him as an arrogant, anti-social
"builder-up" illustrates Melville's own ambiguous response to Emerson as documented in
his correspondence, which reflects the complex relationship to Emerson's philosophy he
portrays in his fictional works.
F. O. Matthiessen states in the preface to his 1941 American Renaissance that
"Emerson's theory of expression was that on which Thoreau built, to which Whitman
gave extension, and to which Hawthorne and Melville were indebted to being forced to
react against its philosophical assumptions" (xii). As a model or one to react against,
Emerson significantly impacted the writers of the American Romantic movement.
R.W.B. Lewis' 1955 The American Adam reinforces the division of the American
Romantic movement and uses Emerson's terms to delineate between the "party of Hope"
comprised of Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau and the "party of Memory," Hawthorne
and Melville (7). The scholarly emphasis on the differences between Emerson and
Melville begins with the earliest scholars of American literature and continues to be one
of the basic assumptions made in current criticism.
Matthiessen finds Melville's "reaction against transcendentalism and other current
optimisms" in Moby-Dick in IshmaeFs recognition of evil (436), in Melville's instinctive
"knowledge of the demonism in the world" (440), and in Melville's distortion of
Emerson's hero, a man of will, who "swept his whole crew to destruction" (456).

Howard P. Vincent adds in his 1949 The Trying-Out of Moby-Dick that the novel is
among other interpretations "a satire of New England Transcendentalism" (8). In "The
Mast-Head" chapter he argues that "transcendental harmony, in which the personal
identity is lost in infinity, is deceptively seductive" (151) but will have consequences in
the brute, material facts of life, the "Descartian vortices" (157). Vincent also
demonstrates Melville's association of transcendentalism with Platonism: "To Melville,
the Transcendentalist and his ancestor Plato were pure absolutists, men sidestepping the
intrusive fact of evil" (256-7). Michael J. Hoffinan's 1969 "The Anti-Transcendentalism
of Moby-Dick?'' asserts that "though anti-Transcendental, it is written in the
Transcendental style" and "is ultimately a parody of the Transcendentalist 'great man'"
(3). He finds much of Melville's response to Emerson in Ahab, who is also one of the
dangerous "builders-up" in the world who "project their own values onto the universe"
(5).
th
Reflecting later 20 century trends in criticism, Michael Vannoy Adams' 1983
"Whaling and Difference: Moby-Dick Deconstructed" attributes the difference between
Emerson's transparent eyeball and Melville's pasteboard mask to "the difference between
transcendentalist and deconstructor" (60). Like Hoffman, Adams is mainly concerned
with the correspondence between nature (signifier) and the spiritual realm (signified).
Restating the difference between Emerson as one whose natural world corresponds
directly to the spiritual (as individual projection) and Melville, whose natural world
corresponds to the spiritual but cannot be deciphered by humankind, Adams simply
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restates the prior criticism in the new terms of deconstruction theory. The 1986
publication of A Companion to Melville Studies finds critics still engaging with the
Emerson-Melville relationship and affirming Melville's position as anti-transcendental..
Finally, in the 1998 Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville, Paul Giles notes that
"one of the tendencies Melville takes from Emerson ... is an intellectual proclivity to run
different objects or ideas into one another. This is the transcendental style of embracing
disparate entities within one all encompassing circle; in Melville's case, though, these
mirrors lack the metaphysical idealism with which they are endowed by Emerson" (231).
Critics continue to note the pivotal difference between Emerson's idealism and Melville's
realism as Melville's acknowledgement of human limitations that precludes a transparent
vision of nature's exact correspondence to the spiritual realm.
Although some critics do account for Emerson's later essays and change in vision
from pure optimism to a more skeptical vision, the vast majority remain devoted to
presenting Melville and Emerson as antithetical, proving Melville's antitranscendentalism in his portrayal of romantic absolutism in Ahab in Moby-Dick, in
Pierre in Pierre; or The Ambiguities, and in Mark Winsome and Egbert in The
Confidence-Man. In my analysis of these three novels, I hope to demonstrate the
similarities between Melville's vision of equilibrium and Emerson's later skepticism as
recorded in his essays "Experience," "The Skeptic," and "Fate." My contribution
addresses Melville's agreement with Emerson's modified theory of correspondences, his
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flashes of intuition as a path to balance between the spiritual and physical worlds, and his
conception of fate as the determinant factor in human activity and knowledge.
In Chapter I, '"Call Me a Post-Transcendentalist': Spiritual Correspondence and
Inscrutability in Melville's Moby-Dick and Emerson's Later Essays," 1 argue against
critics Hoffman and Adams and demonstrate Melville's inability to determine distinct
meaning as similar to Emerson's later, nebulous position. In Chapter II, "Melville's
Pierre, or the Ambiguities and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship: Distinct Paths
to Equilibrium," I examine Emerson's and Melville's similar paths to equilibrium by
analyzing Melville's use of the Bildungsroman form in Pierre. The incipient expression
of the Bildungsroman tradition, a book Melville borrowed from Duyckinck in 1850
before writing Pierre in 1851, Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship serves as a foil
to highlight the similarities between Goethe's, Melville's and Emerson's later affirmation
of balance and the differences between Goethe's gradual educational path and Melville's
and Emerson's circular path of intuition, experience, and skepticism. Finally, in Chapter
III, "Melville's Parody of Early Emersonian Beliefs in The Confidence-ManI examine
Melville's only direct portrayal of Emerson as philosopher in The Confidence-Man and
suggest the similarities between Melville's critique and Emerson's more conservative
stance in his later essays, specifically his altered belief in the power of fate over human
will. This study brings to light the similarities between Melville and the later Emerson
that most critics dismiss or ignore in their attempts to prove Melville's antitranscendentalism. Melville and the more mature Emerson open the door to the

American Realism movement by questioning the absolute idealism of the Transcendental
movement. The idealistic movement Emerson initiated with the 1836 publication of
Nature he tempers with the 1840s publications of his later essays, in which his
skepticism allows for a more realistic perception of the world.

CHAPTER I
'Call Me a Post-Transcendentalist': Spiritual Correspondence and
Inscrutability in Melville's Moby-Dick and Emerson's Later Essays
"How may unlettered Ishmael hope to read the awful Chaldee of the Sperm Whale's
brow? I but put that brow before you. Read it if you can" (Moby-Dick 449).
Attempting for decades to interpret the meaning of the white whale in Melville's
Moby-Dick, most critics read the whale's significance as specific and certain, whether it
be as an analogue for the heavenly God or the demonic, Ahab's id, or as a projection
resulting from an "unindividuated" animus. Representing the other end of the critical
spectrum, Hoffman claims that Melville's Moby-Dick is a "transcendental parody," a
symbolic tale devoid of any real meaning that proves that "the world exists," that
"physical reality is nothing more nor less than what it is," and that "nature has no value"
(3). In other words, he asserts that Melville's novel is completely ironic and that the
white whale and the novel itself mean nothing. Generating a large volume of criticism
with ever-contradicting interpretations of the whale's meaning or lack thereof, the critics
have unconsciously and unintentionally proved Melville's contention that humankind
cannot ascertain the meaning of Moby Dick or any other part of the natural world. As
Melville addresses the reader directly about the existence of the prodigious whale, one
can substitute "critics" for "landsmen":
So ignorant are most landsmen of some of the plainest and most palpable
wonders of the world, that without some hints touching the plain facts,

9

historical and otherwise, of the fishery, they might scout at Moby Dick as a
monstrous fable, or still worse and more detestable, a hideous and
intolerable allegory. (276)
Despite the numerous chapters dedicated to specific details of Moby Dick's physical
existence, most "landsmen" or critics cannot help analyzing the tale as symbolical,
metaphorical, or intolerably allegorical. Encouraging such interpretations, the author
presents paradoxical illustrations of the whale as both a "grand god" (691) and one with a
"malicious intelligence" (692). While not able to be interpreted definitively one way or
another, the whale ambiguously suggests a greater poignancy than that which the author,
any of the characters, or the reader may be able to ascertain. In short, the text invites
multiple interpretations of Moby Dick and concludes that absolute meaning is not
determinable. Much more provocative and feasible than an analysis of the whale's
"meaning" is an examination of Melville's belief in a higher, spiritual significance of
objects in the natural world. In spite of his mythmaking, Melville ultimately affirms a
spiritual, "certain significance" in the world and questions only humanity's ability to
grasp it in Moby-Dick.
While critics like Hoffman and Vincent assert the anti-transcendentalism of
Moby-Dick and explicate the text as a parody of the pantheistic American Romantic
movement, the deficiencies of such critical analyses become apparent in two pivotal
respects. First, the main crux of Melville's philosophy, namely the belief that the
physical world signifies the spiritual realm beyond the "pasteboard masks" (220), is
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greatly indebted to Emerson's early theory of correspondences. In "Nature" Emerson
suggests that "spiritual facts are represented by natural symbols" (33), the equivalent of
Melville's pasteboard masks and what lies beyond them. Second, the older, more mature
Emerson continued to believe in the theory of correspondences, but doubted the human
ability to extract true knowledge of the spirit world from natural surroundings. In
"Montaigne; or The Skeptic" Emerson's transcendentalism includes the often restricted
faculties of humankind in which "knowledge is the knowing that we can not know"
(295). Accepting Emerson's early premise of the theory of correspondence and
concurring with his later skepticism, Melville portrays Emerson's philosophy concerning
the corresponding physical and spiritual worlds and humankind's limited insights into the
world beyond in Moby-Dick, rendering the novel both a parody of Emerson's idealistic
transcendentalism and an affirmation of Emerson's later skeptical temperament.
Unlike Ahab who considers "there's naught beyond . . . pasteboard masks" (22021), Ishmael insists upon the existence of the spiritual world. Explaining our blindness to
that world, Ishmael affirms the afterlife with conviction: "Methinks that in looking at
things spiritual, we are too much like oysters observing the sun through the water, and
thinking that thick water the thinnest of air. Methinks my body is but the lees of my
better being" (66). Rather than the purely good deity Starbuck sees reflected in the
universe or the evil Ahab projects onto Moby Dick, Ishmael questions the limited human
capacity for perception of the spiritual. Rendering spiritual knowledge impossible to
comprehend until this life is over, he explains that "we, too, who look on the loom are
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deafened, and only when we escape it shall we hear the thousand voices that speak
through it" (573). Ishmael's inability to comprehend the physical world explains his
perception of the deity as one of indifference: "The weaver-god, he weaves; and by that
weaving is he deafened, that he hears no mortal voice" (573). The weal and woe of
human emotion projected onto the natural world cannot determine the certain spiritual
significance of the universe outside the realm of human consciousness. In other words,
Ahab's projection of hatred onto the white whale does not determine the white whale's
meaning as such; despite Ahab's emotional creation of a universe inside his mind, the
celestial meaning of the material world will forever elude him.
Once he establishes the existence of the spiritual realm, Ishmael asserts Emerson's
theory of correspondences and maintains the connection between obj ects in the physical
world and their significance in the world beyond. "The Doubloon" chapter begins with
Ishmael's concern that "some certain significance lurks in all things, else all things are
little worth" (549). In other words, all things in the physical world must have a definite,
fixed, correspondent meaning in the spiritual world, or the physical world has no value.
If the physical world had no value, Ahab's monomaniac quest would be as valid as
IshamaeFs equilibrium. If nature does not correspond to the spiritual realm and has no
meaning at all, Ahab's insistent, fixed definition of natural symbols would be no less
incorrect than Ishmael's vision of paradoxical values in nature. Melville's vision of
equilibrium between the spiritual and physical worlds requires a "certain significance" of
a material world of worth and value. For the perceptually limited crew of the Pequod, the
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doubloon only "mirrors back [their] own mysterious sel[ves]," a fact which precludes
their ability to see any relationship between objects in the physical world and their
spiritual meaning (551). It follows that when gazing upon the doubloon Ahab sees pains
and pangs, Starbuck sees the Trinity, Stubb sees the jolly life, and Flask sees 960 cigars.
From his privileged view of the universe after falling into the infinite ocean of thought,
Pip, in his grammar exercise, emphasizes the various and limited perceptions of men: "I
look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they look" (555). At the end of the chapter,
Pip has the last word and interprets the gold coin in gibberish or "heaven's sense" (530),
affirming Ishmael's spiritually correspondent natural world.
Accepting human perception of the natural world as fallible, Melville privileges
Ishmael's ability to see the paradoxical, ultimately irreconcilable spiritual significance of
Moby Dick as the highest possible achievement of humanity in a fallen world.
Contrarily, Ahab's desire to reach beyond the capabilities of humankind and obtain
knowledge of the universe prefaces his downfall. The shaggy sea captain endorses
Emerson's theory of correspondences but cannot accept human ignorance:
All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks ... If man strike,
strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside by thrusting
through the wall? To me, the white whale is the wall, shoved near to me.
Sometimes I think there's naught beyond ... I see in [Moby Dick]
outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it. That
inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate, (my emphasis 220-1)
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Unable to accept the indeterminacy of Moby Dick as Ishmael can, Ahab equates the
whiteness of the whale with the world's "inscrutability." Powerless to see all with a
transparent eyeball, as Emerson's early transcendental reveries would accomplish, Ahab
cannot see through the opaque whale. Gene Bluestein concurs and suggests that Ahab,
"unwilling to rest satisfied with the limited knowledge Emerson's esthetic would provide,
. . . wants Paradise itself (113). He argues that Emerson's momentary transcendental
intuitions will not satiate Ahab's desire to permanently reside in the realm of absolute
truth. Contrasting the all-seeing transcendental eyeball and the transparency of the
natural world during such intuitions, Melville depicts the permanent, ungraspable,
unknowable meaning of the physical world through the opaque whiteness of the whale.
Like Emerson's early depiction of a disunited man whose "axis of vision is not
coincident with the axis of things," and sees the world not as "transparent but opaque"
("Nature" 55), the opaque whiteness of the whale portrays both ambiguity and human
limitation. Emerson's early aesthetic lays the groundwork for Melville's and Emerson's
later conclusion that humankind exists in a constant state of opaqueness in which the
once all-knowing intuitions occur less and less frequently and reveal less and less about
the spiritual world. The color white suggests the ambiguity of good and evil and human
inability to attach certain spiritual significance to physical objects. The squid, the
"unearthly, formless, chance-like apparition of life" (366), produces the same horror of
nothingness as the whiteness of the whale: "The great principle of light, for ever remains
white or colorless in itself, and if operating without medium upon matter, would touch all
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objects, even tulips and roses, with its own blank tinge" (264). The "blank tinge" like the
blank forehead of the whale cannot be deciphered beyond humankind's fallible
projections. The "medium" that "touchfes] all objects" is the moods and thoughts of the
human mind that color the white essence of all physical objects. Not suggesting a lack of
inherent, spiritual meaning, the whiteness reveals humankind's inability to determine that
meaning and attempt to project meaning onto that blank, white surface.
Ahab, like the critics of Moby-Dick, cannot resist assigning definite meaning to
the whale. His frustration with human ignorance culminates in his projection of all things
negative onto Moby Dick's white, blank forehead and body. Following Emerson's lead
in "Experience" in which he asserts that "temperament also enters fully into the system of
illusions and shuts us in a prison of glass which we cannot see" (258), Melville explores
the negative consequences of a natural world that reflects only human mood and thought.
Ahab sees the whale as a reflection of his own unified hatred and bitterness:
The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac incarnation of all
those malicious agencies ... all the subtle demonisms of life and thought;
all evil to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically
assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale's white hump the sum
of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down.
(246-7)
The tragic end of the Pequod and its crew results from Ahab's subjective perceptions of
Moby Dick. The false, unreliable human projections of meaning onto the physical world

15

bring Ahab no closer to understanding the correspondent spirit-realm that both Melville
and Emerson envisioned.
Through Ahab's monomaniac, subjective projections of meaning onto Moby
Dick, Melville explores the Emersonian notion of a world that exists only in the mind.
For Ahab no object truly exists outside of his hatred for the white whale: "Oh! How
immaterial are all materials! What things real are there, but imponderable thoughts?"
(666). The whale's signifying "imponderable thoughts" is the only thing that exists for a
man "so far gone ... in the dark side of the earth, that its other side, the theoretic bright
one seems but uncertain twilight to [him]" (667). Not able to appreciate the paradoxical
significance of the dark and light or the physical and spiritual, Ahab cannot observe the
existence of a world outside of his mind. Unlike Melville and Ishmael, Ahab assigns only
dark spiritual meanings to objects, cannot see beyond the physical reality of death, and
therefore identifies Queequeg's coffin as a symbol of physical death. Affirming an
objective reality outside of subjective perception, the author expresses two possible
meanings of the coffin. He says that in the "spiritual sense" the coffin could be an
"immortality preserver" (667), demonstrating the paradoxical, physical death and spiritual
life that the coffin/life-buoy could represent to a balanced mind such as Ishmael's. The
destructive capacity of Ahab's limited vision allows him to see the coffin as only a
symbol of physical death; this limited vision Emerson warns against in "Experience":
"Perhaps these subject lenses have a creative power; perhaps there are no objects" (269).
In his later essays Emerson acknowledges the limited power of perception and affirms the
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existence of the palpable world. In "The Skeptic" he acknowledges the existence of a
physical world completely outside of and undetermined by his mind: "I can reason down
or deny every thing, except this perpetual Belly: feed he must and will, and I cannot make
him respectable" (297). Emerson's acknowledgement of a physical world beyond the
control of his intellect concurs with Melville's depiction of the existence of an
ambiguous, indeterminable one.
Melville and Emerson believe in a correspondent spiritual realm and humanity's
inability to decipher the spiritual significance of natural objects. Adams notes that any
multiplicity for Emerson is "grounded in what he calls . . . 'that Over-Soul'," whereas
Melville "defines ambiguity not as multiplicity of meaning but as indeterminacy of
meaning" (59). Despite the allowance for evil and pessimism in his later essays, Emerson
still finds comfort in the overriding presence of the divine: "Into every intelligence there
is a door which is never closed through which the creator passes" ("Experience" 259).
Even though the physical world remains connected to the Over-Soul or the creator,
Emerson articulates the inability to ascertain the certain spiritual correspondence between
the physical and the spiritual in his later essays. While Adams articulates the difference
"between the transparent eyeball and the pasteboard mask" as the difference "between
[Emerson's] transcendentalist and [Melville's] deconstructor" (60), his assessment of
Melville's indeterminacy of meaning as deconstructionist ignores Melville's belief in the
spiritual significance of the material world. Although to human beings the physical world
may appear to be an infinite deferment of meaning to an endless chain of signifiers, for
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Melville those signifiers do correspond to a celestial realm. Whereas Emerson sees one
unifying "signified" in nature that corresponds to the Over-Soul of the spiritual realm but
cannot decipher the signifiers, Melville sees a divide between the physical and spiritual so
slippery that humanity's various perspectives and projections simply prove humanity's
inability to grasp the spiritual knowledge of life.
Even though Melville paradoxically represents the ungraspable deity as good and
evil, he grounds this multiplicity in a divine unity similar to Emerson's philosophy.
Michael Strelow asserts that an Emersonian, spiritually grounded centering can be found
in Melville's apparent multiplicity: "Moby-Dick is full of balances, meditations, centers
defined by extremes" (138). The false dichotomy set up my many critics to comprehend
the differences between Emerson's Over-soul and Melville's pluralities and the objective
and subjective states of the physical world falters in light of their shared belief in
determinism. Emerson abandons such terms as the Over-Soul and the Eternal Cause in
his essay "Fate" and suggests that we "build altars to the Beautiful Necessity" of
humanity's limited ability to intervene with what has been predetermined by fate (352).
Fate is a limitation "impassable by any insight of man. In its last and loftiest ascensions,
insight itself and the freedom of the will is one of its obedient members" ("Fate" 339).
Both Emerson and Melville believe in predetermination by fate, destiny, or the divinity,
something beyond the control of man's subjective thoughts. In spite of all the illusory
meanings projected onto Moby Dick, Melville ultimately leaves the significance of the
whale ambiguous and independent of human thought. The whale's "predestinating head"
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suggests the presence of the creator, a whale determined by God (720). Ishmael also
describes the craft as "predestinated" (526) and states that "we are all in the hands of the
Gods" (529). Emerson also speaks of life as "predetermined" with one future that "all the
privilege and all the legislation of the world cannot meddle or help" ("Fate" 334). Daryl
Lott links Melville's and Emerson's philosophy in their "quest for truth" and asserts that
both "believed that inspiration for such inquiry came from beyond the self (58).
Ultimately, their shared deterministic, essential conception of a spiritual realm stems
from a deity beyond human comprehension.
Cognizant of both good and evil and aware of the physical and its ungraspable
spiritual significance, Ishmael portrays the healthy, balanced spirit espoused by both
Melville and Emerson. Calling Ishmael a post-transcendentalist, I distinguish Ishmael's
position as commensurate with Emerson's later skepticism, tempering the "all knowing"
capacity of the fleeting, momentary insights of Emerson's more idealistic, transcendental
phase with the knowledge of both good and evil and "knowing that we can not know"
("The Skeptic" 295). Unlike Gregory Grewell, who bravely asserts that "Melville's
Moby-Dick pursues, tests, and proves the transcendental ideas expounded in Emerson's
"Nature" (138), Peter Quigley suggests Melville criticizes Ishmael as a traditional
transcendentalist commensurate with Emerson's early philosophy. Quigley argues that
Ishmael represents a transcendentalist in terms of Emerson's early definitions. He
challenges Melville's philosophical alignment with Ishmael and reads his portrayal as
"precisely the coopted Romantic mythology that Melville portrays as helping to drive
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expansionist politics" (48). Quigley's desire to find political motivations in Moby-Dick
depend upon a tenuous assumption that Melville is strictly an anti-transcendentalist and
that Ishmael is a transcendentalist in terms of the definitions in Emerson's early essays.
Ishmael's combined vision of good and evil in the world intimated through
intuitions and questioned by doubts demonstrates Melville's approbation of a later, more
balanced Emersonian post-transcendentalism. Despite the constant evil influence of
Ahab's monomania, Ishmael can see both the demonic and the heavenly potential in
Moby Dick:
So in dreams, have I seen majestic Satan thrusting forth his tormented
colossal claw from the flame Baltic of Hell. But in gazing at such scenes,
it is all in all what mood you are in; if in the Dantean, the devils will occur
to you; if in that of Isaiah, the archangels. (485)
It is the ultimately ambiguous meaning of natural objects that encourages Ishmael to see
both the material and the spiritual significance in the vapor from the White Whale's
spout: "Doubts of all things earthly, and intuitions of some things heavenly; this
combination makes neither believer nor infidel, but makes a man who regards them both
with equal eye" (480). Ishmael's balancing of transcendental intuitions of spirituality via
the natural world and the sobering doubts of the mind confronted by the contradictory
physical world directly affirm Emerson's "new statement" in "Experience" which "will
comprise the skepticisms as well as the faiths of society" (269). While Melville's "dark
side ... is two thirds of this earth" (542), and Emerson's world contains the good in
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"heaping measures" ("Experience" 263), humankind must acknowledge evil and affirm
the good as Ishmael does. Melville's Ishmael is a literary manifestation of Emerson's
skeptic, one whose "beliefs consist in accepting the affirmations of the soul; unbelief, in
denying them" (299).
Ishmael's wisdom extends beyond his balanced temperament and
acknowledgement of both good and evil; he recognizes his own limitations and accepts
the inscrutability of Moby Dick and the rest of the natural, physical world, a concurrent
theme in Emerson's later essays. Confirming his own limitations as the narrator of events
and as a human being, Ishmael astutely states that "all this to explain, would be to dive
deeper than Ishmael can go" (251). He proclaims Moby Dick the exemplar of the
indecipherable natural world imbued with spiritual significance:
But in the great Sperm Whale, this high and mighty god-like dignity
inherent in the brow is so immensely amplified, that gazing on it, in that
full front view, you feel the Deity and dread powers more forcibly than in
beholding any other object in living nature. For you see no one point
precisely; not one distinct feature is revealed. (447-8)
Equating Moby Dick with the ungraspable, Ishmael refers to the decapitated head of the
Sperm Whale as "the Sphynx's in the desert" (405) and as "a dead, blind wall" (436).
Ishmael not only recognizes Moby Dick as paradoxical, indecipherable, and yet spiritually
significant, but he also recognizes human fallibility in interpreting this grand symbol:
"Phrenologically the head of this Leviathan ... is an entire delusion. . . . The whale, like
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all things that are mighty, wears a false brow to the common world" (450). Ultimately
unable to read the false brow, Ishmael exclaims his perception of the world and Moby
Dick: "Dissect him how I may, then, I but go skin deep; I know him not, and never will"
(486). Melville and the older Emerson agreed upon humanity's inability to punch
through the pasteboard masks and truly know the world beyond. Amending the image of
the all-knowing transcendental eyeball, Emerson's later essay "The Skeptic" defines
knowledge as "the knowing that we can not know" (295).
Emerson's later skeptical regard for human knowledge of the infinite and his
theory of correspondences exemplify the qualified post-transcendentalism he and
Melville ultimately shared. Both Melville and the later Emerson found significance in
momentary intuitions as proof of a spiritual realm that will not divulge its secrets to
humankind. Far from Emerson's early transparent world, the paradoxical, corresponding
palpable world reveals the human condition: ignorance of the divine. Keeping one foot in
the natural world at all times, the balanced soul recognizes the ambiguity of spiritual
significance and concedes the dangerous consequences of the "unbalanced" mind
insistent upon a fixed, correspondent reality. Believing in a spiritual world that lies
beyond the "pasteboard masks," Melville and the skeptical Emerson applaud the
individual who can see evil, still affirm the good, and can glimpse the spiritual without
losing footing in the physical world and falling from the mast head. Ishmael, who
maintains an "insular Tahiti" (364) and exemplifies this philosophy, concedes his own
restricted knowledge of Moby Dick as the narrator and as a human being who "know[s]
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him not and never will" (486). Emerson admits as much about himself in "Experience"
and says he would be "very content with knowing, if only [he] could know" (273).
Melville both challenges the reader of Moby-Dick to seek the "ungraspable" mystery of
the world and humanity, "this solitary jet," that "seem[s] for ever alluring us on," as he
continuously warns against the search for the unknowable knowledge of the divine (311).
Emerson states the situation less paradoxically at the close of "The Skeptic":
Let a man learn to look for the permanent in the mutable and fleeting; let
him learn to bear the disappearance of things he was wont to reverence
without losing his reverence; let him learn that he is here, not to work but
to be worked upon; and that, though abyss open under abyss, and opinion
displace opinion, all are at last contained in the Eternal Cause:— (301)
Melville and Emerson as post-transcendentalists accept the paradox of believing in the
spiritual significance of the universe without being able to decipher its exact meaning.
Believing in the determination by the "Eternal Cause," Emerson still finds that cause
more benevolent than Melville's ambiguous one. Not abandoning the belief in things
spiritual, the ideal hero for Melville or ideal human being for the older Emerson observes
evidence of the celestial realm without losing his or her grip on the tangible, knowable
existence of the physical world in which he or she must live.
Melville and the later Emerson aver post-transcendentalism, or realism, as the
goal of the individual's search and formulate similar paths to achieve this harmony
between the spiritual and earthly worlds. Melville leaves behind the travel narrative form
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of Moby-Dick and continues his "truth seeking" in the form of the Bildungsroman in his
subsequent novel, Pierre. Aborting the form at the end of the novel, Melville rejects
Bildung or the gradual educational development as the path to equilibrium and favors
Emerson's path consisting of momentary spiritual insights tempered by skepticism.
Unfortunately, his absolutist protagonist, Pierre, despairs in the face of doubt coupled
with the fear of demonic forces or, even worse, an abyss of nothing at all. Like Ahab,
Pierre cannot balance intuitions of things celestial and doubts as Ishmael can.

CHAPTER II
Melville's Pierre, or The Ambiguities and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship:
Distinct Paths to Equilibrium
Henry A. Murray's introduction to the Hendricks House 1949 edition of Pierre, or
The Ambiguities, attributes Melville's "spiritual autobiography in the form of a novel" to
his reading in 1849 of "Rousseau's Confessions, Goethe's Autobiography, De Quincey's
Autobiographical Sketches and Confessions of an Opium Eater, Sartor Resartus, and
there are reasons to believe, Pendennis and Lavengro, both of which are partial selfrevelations" (xxiv). Certainly not the first to speculate on the effects of Melville's
extensive reading on his writings, Murray misses a potential source for Pierre's "spiritual
autobiography," Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, a book Melville borrowed
from Duyckinck in 1850 just before writing Pierre in 1851-2 (Sealts 179). Commonly
considered the archetypal Bildungsroman and the initiator of the German tradition,
Goethe's novel addresses the cultural and educational development of the hero and the
dichotomous tensions between the temporary and the eternal, the individual and the
infinite, and the earthly and the spiritual, parallel themes in Pierre.
Whereas the influence of Goethe's Faust and Autobiography upon Melville's
Moby-Dick have been thoroughly analyzed, the specific impact of Goethe's Wilhelm
Meister's Apprenticeship on Pierre remains unacknowledged. James Mclntosh asserts
the influence of Goethe's Weaver-Gods in Faust on Melville's Moby-Diet, Walter Reed
draws parallels between the "Midnight Forecastle" chapter in Moby-Dick and the
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Walpurgisnight in Faust. Robert Milder asserts the impact of Goethe's description of
demonism as a force in the world in his Autobiography on Melville's Moby-Dick and, to
a lesser extent, on Pierre in "Nemo Contra Deum . . . : Melville and Goethe's Demonic."
Melville's direct quote from Goethe's Autobiography at the end of chapter IV in Pierre,
"Nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse" (Nobody is against God unless it be God Himself)
and the numerous indictments of Goethe's idealistic philosophic vision in the text directly
connect Goethe with Pierre.
Although no substantive study of the relationship between Goethe's Wilhelm
Meister's Apprenticeship and Melville's Pierre exists, many scholars and critics read
Melville's Mardi, Moby-Dick, Pierre and The Confidence-Man as novels modeled after
the Bildungsroman tradition. Milder believes that Melville himself developed as an
author while writing Mardi, and claimed that "Mardi. .. was his Bildungsroman''' (209).
Martin Christadler challenges comparative scholars to assess the relationship between
Melville's fiction and the Bildungsroman tradition, suggesting Melville's use of
Bildungsgeschichte (educational/developmental history) in the narrative of Ishmael's
journey from alienation to integration in Moby-Dick. Walter Reed connects the German
tradition with Pierre, "an almost stereo-typed interweaving of the Gothic novel and
Bildungsroman ' (An Exemplary History of the Novel 202), and reads it as an "abortive
Bildungsroman,, (Meditations on the Hero 181). Proceeding from Reed's passing
observations, I suggest that in Pierre Melville writes within Goethe's narrative form in
order to demonstrate the fallible assumptions made by the Bildungsroman tradition.
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Comparing Melville's abortive Bildungsroman with the incipient expression of that
tradition, Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, illuminates Goethe's and Melville's shared
goal of equilibrium between the spiritual and physical realm and the disparate paths each
endorses to achieve that harmonious balance.
In Melville's rejection of Goethe's theory of Bildung as the path to equilibrium,
he unconsciously aligns himself with Emerson whose sporadic, transcendent intuition,
eventually leads to a skeptical balance in his later essays. In Pierre Melville intimates the
connection between Goethe and Emerson (the Yankee disciple of Greek and German
philosophy), who purport to have deciphered the greater mysteries in life: "Plato, and
Spinoza, and Goethe, and many more belong to this guild of self-imposters, with a
preposterous rabble of Muggletonian Scots and Yankees, whose vile brogue still the more
bestreaks the stripedness of their Greek or German Neoplatonic originals" (290).
Melville equates Goethe's philosophy with Romantic idealism and fails to acknowledge
the similarities between Goethe's mature vision of equilibrium and his own. Contrasting
Emerson's path to enlightenment through momentary flashes of intuition with Goethe's
gradual, evolutionary path, Christadler suggests that Melville's and Goethe's paths to
truth converge in the gradual education and socialization of the hero through Bildung.
Arguing against Christadler's theory, I shall demonstrate that Emerson's early spiritual
intuition that culminates in a skeptical equilibrium between the terrestrial and celestial
worlds more closely resembles Melville's ideal path to harmony than Goethe's gradual
educational development.
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The German narrative tradition of the Bildungsroman begins with Goethe's
Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, and all subsequent attempts in German literature to
write within the genre are compared to this benchmark. Due to contemporary and
modem critical attention to Goethe's novel as the initial expression of the Bildungsroman
tradition, the abstract qualities found in the tradition and the specific characteristics of
Wilhelm Meister are the same. Although modem critics like Martin Swales identifies
Wieland's 1767 Agathon as the "first of the great Bildungsromanethe term was first
coined by Karl Morgenstem in the early 1820s, who identified Wilhelm Meister's
Apprenticeship as its incipient realization and defined the genre as follows:
It will justly bear the name Bildungsroman firstly and primarily on account
of its thematic material, because it portrays the Bildung of the hero in its
beginnings and growth to a certain stage of completeness; and also
secondly because it is by virtue of this portrayal that it furthers the reader's
Bildung to a much greater extent than any other kind of novel. (Swales
12)
Occupied with the growth process, or Werden (becoming), of the protagonist, the
Bildungsroman concerns itself with the process rather than a specific goal (Swales 34). If
one were to extract a goal, it would be to find inner harmony with the outer world, to
reach an equilibrium of activity and contemplation, or to achieve socialization after a
process of cultural education. The end of Goethe's novel remains unresolved and
continues long after the protagonist has achieved any specific goal. This irresolution
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prompted discussions about the novel in the correspondence between Goethe and Schiller
and in countless critical debates involving Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Hegel and others
(Swales 26-8). The problem of theory and practice or inward contemplation of the soul
and the experience of palpable reality plagued contemporary critics and continues to defy
modem readers. That very irresolution of contentious dichotomies Melville addresses in
his chapter on "chronometrical" and "horological" time and directly confronts with his
more decisive and tragic ending in Pierre.
Pierre can be read as a novel with the outward trappings of the Bildungsroman
tradition that rejects the theory of gradual educational and experiential development, the
crux of Goethe's theory of Bildung. The following analysis of plot, theme, form, and
theory as they appear in Pierre and Wilhelm Meister 's Apprenticeship demonstrates
significant analogues and disparities between the two works. Such a study reveals the
similar goals but varied paths to achieve that goal. Even though the mature Goethe that
wrote the Bildungsroman, the later Emerson, and Melville agree that equilibrium is the
goal of spiritual enlightenment, Goethe's gradual path to truth and harmony differs from
both Melville's and Emerson's circular path of insight, experience, and skepticism.
Using Goethe's novel and the Bildungsroman tradition as a foil, I will illuminate the
similarities between Melville's and Emerson's paths.
Goethe's young Wilhelm leaves the comforts of his bourgeois surroundings and
takes up life in the theater, enacting the role of Hamlet both on and off the stage. He falls
in love several times, meets and loses companions, errs and finds his way with the help of
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"fate." Erroneously remaining too long in the company of actors, he takes a message to a
nobleman, stays at his castle, and falls in love with the nobleman's sister, Natalia. He
discovers that he is an apprentice in the secret Society of the Tower, a group of
philosophers seeking to observe and better the experiences and education of people.
Once the philosophers determine the end of his apprenticeship, Wilhelm marries Natalia,
who has purchased from Wilhelm's father his grandfather's art collection. Towards the
end of the novel, the hero reintegrates into society through the Society of the Tower,
marriage and the inheritance of his lost "kingdom," his grandfather's cultural pieces. The
novel does not end there. Wilhelm engages in more philosophical discussions and plans a
trip to Italy with his son. This problematic, irresolute ending leaves the reader with an
open-ended narrative in which one assumes that Wilhelm has just started down the path
of a lifelong process and will keep contemplating inner truths and learning about the
natural world, achieving greater and greater harmony along the way.
Also turning to Hamlet as his guide, Melville's Pierre chooses to act upon the
letter he receives and leave the comforts of his bourgeois surroundings to right his
father's wrong and care for his illegitimate sister, Isabel, by declaring her to be his wife.
Estranged from his mother and cousin, Pierre is left to enact this noble deed without help
from society or God. He and Isabel live in the Church of the Apostles, home to a group
of young philosophers who are disciples of Kant and other German philosophers.
Attempting to write a novel he is too immature to write about truths he, as a human being,
cannot grasp, he reacts to the elusiveness of truth with despair and damages his physical
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and emotional health trying to attain it. Reunited with his former fiancee, Lucy, Pierre
and the two women live together isolated from society and kill themselves out of
desperation at the end of the novel.
Pierre, like Wilhelm Meister, employs the plot and themes common in the
Bildungsroman tradition. Pierre, like Wilhelm, finds guidance in literary works and
leaves home to go on a quest. Addressing the contradictions of nurturing the inward soul
and interacting in society, both protagonists acknowledge the dangers of overcontemplation as exemplified by Hamlet. Towards the end of the novel, Pierre finds
himself in a society of philosophers, in the company of his sister, and reunited with his
former love. Wilhelm also enters a philosophical society, discovers kinship with his son,
and reunites with Natalia, the object of his affection. Although the similar thumbnail
sketches reveal superficial similarities between the two novels, a closer analysis of Karl
Morgenstem's definition of the Bildungsroman and how each novel either fulfills or
rejects those concerns betrays Pierre as the imposter posing within the form.
Both protagonists appear to engage in the major components oiBildung,
educational and experiential development through learning. Pierre and Wilhelm quote
the same two lines from Hamlet,
The time is out ofjoint;-Oh cursed spite,
That ever I was bom to set it right! (Pierre 235; Wilhelm Meister 231)
They view their own situations as analogous to Hamlet's, learn from literary works, and
apply that knowledge to their experience in the world. Pierre's and Wilhelm's similar
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responses to Hamlet and disparate results from such literary-inspired action illuminate the
authors' different views on literary study's value and effect on life. Wilhelm learns from
Hamlet's over-contemplation, alters his response to uncertainty with action, and
appreciates the play as a dramatic performance of life in an aesthetic whole. Wilhelm
argues that human beings cannot make judgments about their own lives, presented to
them in fragments, when they cannot even make judgments about an action presented in
its entirety in the theater:
How can men judge rightly of our actions, which appear but singly or in
fragments to them; of which they see the smallest portion; while good and
bad takes place in secret, and for most part nothing comes to light but an
indifferent show? Are not the actors and actresses in a play set up on
boards before them; lamps are lit on every side; the whole transaction is
comprised within three hours; yet scarcely one of them knows rightly what
to make of it. (75)
The privileged perspective of the whole action in the theater results from taking the
fragmentary pieces of an action out of real time and arranging them in quick succession.
Goethe applies this theory of art to Wilhelm's Bildung, in which he must gain knowledge
gradually through cultural education and experience, and only after the passage of time
may he rightly understand and judge the past. Much as literature reflects life's
fragmentary parts in one whole as Aristotle outlines in the Poetics, Wilhelm
acknowledges how the theater can take a series of seemingly disconnected incidents in
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life, arrange them into a coherent sequence, and demonstrate an action in its entirety.
Wilhelm believes that art's aesthetic privilege over actual life, not succumbing to the
same measure of time, has didactic purposes for the viewer or reader. Karl Morgenstem
finds Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship in full compliance with his prescriptive
characteristics of the Bildungsroman genre. He believes that Goethe's novel primarily
portrays the cultural development of his hero and thereby educates the reader as well.
Melville's Pierre falls short of Morgenstem's definition because it fails to portray
the development of the hero and thereby educate the reader, despite its use of certain
Bildungsroman narrative techniques. Pierre decides to act instead of fall into the overcontemplation that ruined Hamlet. Acting on information morally ambiguous due to his
father's death, Pierre declares himself married to his illegitimate sister, Isabel, an action
that causes the expulsion from his family estate, his fall into social disrepute, and his
struggle to survive in the world. Once his literary-inspired action causes social distress
for him and his family, he becomes discontent with the limited practical applications of
literature and its failure to reveal the spiritual truths he seeks. Pierre realizes that "not
always doth life's beginning gloom conclude in gladness; that wedding-bells peal not ever
in the last scene of life's fifth act" and that even
the profounder emanations of the human mind, intended to illustrate all
that can be humanly known of human life . . . never unravel their own
intricacies, and have no proper endings, but in imperfect, unanticipated
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and disappointing sequels (as mutilated stumps), hurry to abrupt
inteimergings with the eternal tides of time and fate. (199)
Not only the protagonist expresses discontent with literature's limitations, but also
Melville's own cynicism about the power of books to educate and reveal any spiritual
truths can be heard through the voice of the narrator, who tells us that Pierre has not yet
learned that
in reality to a mind bent on producing some thoughtful thing of absolute
Truth, all mere reading is apt to prove but an obstacle hard to overcome;
and not an accelerator helpingly pushing him along. . . . [Pierre] did not
see, that even when [all existing great works] thus combined, all was but
one small mite, compared to the latent infiniteness and inexhaustibility in
himself; that all the great books in the world are but the mutilated
shadowings-forth of invisible and eternally unembodied images in the
soul; so that they are but the mirrors, distortedly reflecting to us our own
things; and never mind what the mirror may be, if we would see the object,
we must look at the object itself, and not at its reflection. (394-6)
Melville's narrator tells the reader directly that literature has no power to educate or
reveal celestial truths. Melville also demonstrates this fact through the tragic results of
Pierre's literary-inspired action and the failure to glean any truth from the books he reads.
Coining the phrase Bildungsroman, Karl Morgenstem emphasized the educational
development of both the novel's hero and the reader; Melville's pseudo-Bildungsroman
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fails in both respects. The reader does not develop or learn from Pierre's failure to
progress and is explicitly told and shown the failure of any books, including Pierre, to
contribute to a reader's development or education.
Melville writes within the superficial form of the Bildungsroman tradition and
addresses the same ambiguities that Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship does. The
dichotomies addressed in Goethe's novel and taken up by Melville include the earthly and
the heavenly, the actual and the potential, the fragmentary and the whole, the individual
and the infinite, and the "horological" and "chronometrical" -the temporary and the
eternal. The most obvious connection between all of these dichotomous elements is the
function of time. For Goethe the passage of chronological time is necessary to gain a
holistic perspective on life and to learn from both the study of culture through education
and the physical experience of life. For Melville and Emerson curiosity about the
spiritual realm occurs instantaneously through momentary insights; with the passage of
time and experience, skepticism tempers those insights to create an equilibrium between
the spiritual and the material worlds, the same goal Goethe's Bildung achieves. Pierre's
absolutist, idealist course appears similar to Emerson's "phase of idealism," but his
inference of evil in the universe does not allow him to emerge from his idealistic phase
unscathed as Emerson did.
In Melville's portrayal of an absolute idealist gone too far, Pierre represents a
parody of Emerson's early transcendentalism. The author uses the Emersonian path to
truth through intuition and idealism to expose its inherent dangers in his portrayal of
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Pierre's tragedy, but to say that Melville finds no value in this path to truth would be an
overstatement. Ishmael, Melville's ideal hero, shares his momentary insights with the
reader and discusses his participation in transcendental reveries. Ishmael's insights never
cause an abandonment of material existence and are portrayed as fruitful and engaging
when tempered by a secure footing in physical reality. Emerson's phase of idealistic
transcendentalism as espoused in his essays entitled "Self-Reliance" and
"Transcendentalism" preface Pierre's (and Ahab's) fall. When Pierre neglects the
physical world for his pursuit of truth in a novel, Melville fills this section of the book
with obvious parodies of the early beliefs and practices of Emerson and his followers.
Once Emerson's own experience in the world tempers his idealism with a skeptical
acknowledgement of both the physical and spiritual realms and the human inability to
grasp celestial truths, Melville and Emerson once again see eye to eye. Unfortunately,
Pierre never recovers from his absolute idealism.
Had Pierre not been so quickly overcome with insights and actively pursued them
in a quest to attain celestial truths at the expense of his physical existence in the world, he
might have been able to achieve an equilibrium not unlike that of Goethe's Wilhelm.
Rather than tell the reader what Bildung consists of, Goethe conveys this process through
Wilhelm's experiences and the eventual judgment of decisions as "errors" or
"progressions." At the end of the novel, privileged with hindsight, Wilhelm learns of his
first love's fidelity and realizes his decision to leave her was a mistake. When he meets
his true love, Natalia, his former attraction to her sister, the Countess, becomes more
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understandable. However, even at the end of the novel the reader feels that this first
insight or looking back with clarity is only the beginning of a lifelong process. The day
his apprenticeship ends and nature pronounces him free "did his own cultivation seem to
have commenced: he felt the necessity of learning, being called upon to teach" his son
(73). Wilhelm also realizes the human limitations of knowledge and "wished to
understand how far man may venture with his thoughts, and what things he may hope
ever to give account of to himself or others" (77). Rather than a discovery that leads to
suicide as in Pierre, Wilhelm's recognition of his own limitations simply mark another
point in his gradual path to self-knowledge. Finally, he emphasizes the path rather than
the goal of his development:
O needless strictness of morality . . . while Nature in her own kindly
manner trains us to all that we require to be. O strange demands of civil
society, which first perplexes and misleads us, then asks of us more than
Nature herself! Woe to every sort of culture which destroys the most
effectual means of all true culture, and directs us to the end, instead of
rendering us happy on the way! (77)
Bildung does not emphasize the attainment of spiritual truths as its goal; rather it stresses
living harmoniously with thought and action, the inward self and the external world.
Moreover, one may be able to understand the significance of past experiences only from
the distance afforded by the passing of chronological, earthly time.
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Melville's concern with earthly time and spiritual time, the "horological" and
"chronometrical," respectively, are outlined by Plotinus Plinlimmon, a philosopher living
in the Church of the Apostles. Pierre reads a discarded copy of Plinlimmon's "Lecture
First" on his way to the city. The pamphlet first explains that human beings concerned
with "things provisional" must also "hold that all our so-called wisdom is likewise but
provisional" (293). Melville's vision of an inscrutable God deaf and mute to human
concerns concurs with the philosophy of the pamphlet thus far. To explain the difference
between heavenly time and earthly time, he uses the analogy of a boat set to Greenwich
time travelling to China. Although the boat is perfectly attuned to Greenwich (heavenly)
time, keeping that time in China is quite useless and will cause peculiar behavior:
sleeping during the day and getting up at night. He concludes that "in an artificial world
like ours, the soul of a man is further removed from its God and the Heavenly Truth, than
the chronometer carried to China, is from Greenwich" (294). One attuned to Greenwich
or eternal time will always contradict the local standards in China or on this earth. The
central message of Plinlimmon lecture is this:
That in things terrestrial (horological) a man must not be governed by
ideas celestial (chronometrical); that certain minor self-renunciations in
this life his own mere instinct for his everyday general well-being will
teach him to make, but he must by no means make a complete
unconditional sacrifice of himself in behalf of any other being, or any
cause, or any conceit. (298-9)
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Pierre's unconditional sacrifice of himself on behalf of Isabel and his cause (to discover
and record celestial truth) places him in violation with Plinlimmon's philosophy. Since
Pierre's attempt to be a "chronometer" fails due to his physical and mental limitations as
a human being, Plinlimmon's promotion of the "horologes" appears to reflect Melville's
vision of balance between the spiritual and material worlds.
Melville's portrayal of Pierre's failed attempt as a "chronometer" and Ishmael's
success as a "horologe" demonstrates the alignment of his vision with Plinlimmon's
philosophy. The pamphlet seems to ask Pierre directly, "What man who carries a
heavenly soul in him, has not groaned to perceive, that unless he committed a sort of
suicide as to the practical things of this world, he never can hope to regulate his earthly
conduct by the same heavenly soul?" (297). Pursuing unknowable truths, Pierre attunes
himself to the "chronometrical," eternal time, commits "a sort of suicide as to the
practical things of this world" leaving his bride, mother and estate behind, ruining many
lives, and ultimately commits an actual, physical suicide. Since Melville does not aver
Pierre's absolutist attuning to the "chronometrical," eternal time, are we to believe that he
agrees with the philosopher's "horological" conclusion, that "a virtuous expediency, then,
seems the highest desirable or attainable earthly excellence for the mass of men, and is
the only earthly excellence that their Creator intended for them" (299)? Lawrance
Thompson points out that to accept that as a suitable model for life would be to live
according to a nominal Christianity, characterized by Pierre's mother's and Reverend
Palsgrave's unchristian abandonment of Delly, the single mother in desperate need of
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help (276). But Plinlimmon's horologes are essentially good, virtuous, compassionate
people who acknowledge God, but also accept their human limitations and allow for
"checked" selfishness and other liabilities. Neither Pierre's bad, hypocritical mother nor
Reverend Palsgrave qualify as a "horologe," an "earnest man, who, among all his human
frailties, is still agonisingly conscious of the beauty of chronometrical excellence" such as
Christ's (300). Melville favors the horological balancing act between acknowledging the
spiritual and trying to be good and virtuous within practical reason as characterized by
Ishmael in Moby-Dick and as affirmed by Emerson in his later essays like "The Skeptic."
Melville presents Pierre's path to find the truth as one that begins with insights or
momentary revelations like Ishmael's and Emerson's all-knowing reveries. Pierre's first
intuitions come to him as a vision of an unknown face and as disturbing feelings he
describes as "airy devils." Lucy also senses the demonic forces as "some nameless
sadness, faintness, strangely" come to her (50) and as an "evil spell" (51). Reflecting
Melville's ambiguous representation of God, Pierre's and Lucy's intuitions are imbued
with an evil significance. Like flashes, these sensations come and go almost momentarily
and open a window between the soul and the divine:
... in these flashing revelations of griefs wonderful fire, we see all things
as they are; and though, when the electric element is gone, the shadows
once more descend, and the false outlines of objects again return; yet not
with their former power to deceive . . . (123)
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An insight into truth leaves the protagonist unable to retreat into his former naive view of
the physical world as the absolute, fixed representation of truth. Now he feels compelled
to search for the truth lurking beyond the earthly shadows. Pierre's strange, "almost
supernatural" feelings that "transcend all verbal renderings" awaken the most important
questions in him: "With the lightning's flash, the query is spontaneously propounded—
chance, or God?" (155) Never denying the presence of God, Melville's primary query is
more likely to address the ambiguous nature of God than it is to question the existence of
a divine being. The significance of these passages is how Pierre glimpses the presence of
a spiritual world and its elusive truths. It is the momentary intuition that awakens
curiosity and the acknowledgement of evil in the world rather than the steady progression
of experience as in the process of Bildung.
Pierre's initial awakening to the spiritual world via momentary insights, his quest
for spiritual truth, and his eventual skepticism about the ability to attain truth follow a
pattern similar to the beginning and development of Ralph Waldo Emerson's
transcendental philosophy. A momentary insight leading to a spiritual awakening
recorded in "Nature" occurs in natural surroundings: "When in fortunate hours we ponder
this miracle, the wise man doubts if at all other times he is not blind and deaf... for the
universe becomes transparent, and the light of higher laws than its own shines through it"
(35). Pierre's first flashes of insight occur outdoors and are similar to Emerson's—with a
dark twist. Following the initial spiritual reveries recorded in "Nature," Emerson adopts
the idealist or transcendentalist philosophy of life:
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As thinkers, mankind have ever divided into two sects, Materialists and
Idealists; the first class founding on experience, the second on
consciousness; the first class beginning to think from the data of the
senses, the second class perceive that the senses are not final, and say, The
senses give us representations of things, but what are the things
themselves, they cannot tell" ("The Transcendentalist" 192-3).
Like Emerson, Pierre leaves behind his safe, material reality relying on experience and
the senses to look for the spiritual significance beyond the material world away from his
family's estate, becoming an idealist or transcendentalist who ignores and neglects the
material world of experience. Pierre's absorption in his own thoughts and the world
inside his head and his book bear a striking resemblance to Emerson's transcendentalist:
"His thought, —that is the Universe" (195).
Chasing after vague intimations of the celestial world, Pierre proceeds in a manner
that only appears consistent with the hero of the Bildungsroman. Awakened by passing
insights and circumstantial knowledge of his father's questionable past, Pierre hastily
decides to act on his desire to save Isabel from ruin. "Saving" Isabel and Delly, he jumps
into a routine of active writing and truth seeking, ruining the lives of every major figure
in the novel. Actively treading the path of experience and making decisions without
understanding their paramount significance or consequences as outlined in the
Bildungsroman, the protagonist realizes the fruitlessness of his efforts: "For the more and
more that he wrote, and the deeper and deeper that he dived, Pierre saw the everlasting
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elusiveness of Truth; the universal lurking insincerity of even the greatest and purest
written thoughts" (472). Not only truth itself but also attempts at truth written down by
human hands in the form of literature or philosophy do not come close to striking beyond
that paste-board mask in Moby-Dick. And like Ahab, Pierre is not content with
Emersonian flashes of intuition—he wants Paradise itself.
The balanced hero of the Bildungsroman does not actively seek truth or any
specific goal, but seeks cultural learning and experience that over time will indirectly lead
him to a truth and harmony between the spiritual and material world attainable by
humankind. Unlike Wilhelm, whose indirect path to equilibrium culminates in his
acceptance of human limitations, Pierre directly searches for the unattainable truth and
despairs when confronted by his own limitations, doubting the existence of God and truth
beyond the terrestrial world. Describing Pierre's desperation at finding absolute truth, the
narrator makes a statement that would seem consistent with the theory of the
Bildungsroman-. "so hath heaven wisely ordained, that on first entering into the
Switzerland of his soul, man shall not at once perceive its tremendous immensity" (396).
What seems a sincere belief in the gradual Bildungsprozess the narrator undermines in the
analogy between the soul of man and the Egyptian mummy: "By vast pains we mine into
the pyramid; by horrible gropings we come to the central room; with joy we espy the
sarcophagus; but we lift the lid—and not body is there!—appallingly vacant as vast is the
soul of a man" (397). Unable to grasp the inscrutability of God and the truths of the
celestial world, the narrator suggests that under the first superficial layer, the world "is
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found to consist of nothing but surface stratified on surface" (397). Writing the "godliest
things" "with the soul of an Atheist" (472), Pierre assumes that his inability to attain truth
unknowable by human beings necessitates the absence of such truth, an excess similar to
Ahab's.
As Pierre's continued search for truth leads him through an idealistic phase to one
of fatal doubts, Emerson's continued truth-seeking in time reveals less and less about the
spiritual world and more and more about the limitations of human consciousness bound
to a material reality. Emerson can no longer deny the omnipresence of the material world
in "Experience": "We live amid surfaces, and the true art of life is to skate well on them"
(261). The narrator's comment in Pierre that the world "is found to consist of nothing
but surface stratified on surface" bears a striking resemblance to Emerson's parallel
development and marks Pierre's first doubt of spiritual existence at all beyond the
material surface of reality (397). Instead of facing his mature skepticism with despair,
Emerson affirms human limitation and suggests we "build altars to the Beautiful
Necessity" ("Fate"352). In other words, let us find joy in what we cannot understand and
trust in the inner harmony of nature without full comprehension of its inner workings.
Unfortunately, Pierre's discovery that he cannot forever neglect the material world and
still cannot attain the elusive, ultimate truth of the spiritual world overwhelms him with
despair and leads to his suicide. His doubts of spiritual existence coincide with his
breakdown in the material world. He no longer has a way to provide for himself and the
women, will be taken to court for misrepresentation by his publisher, and will be

assaulted by his cousin and friend for being a liar. The timing of his loss of faith in the
celestial and failure in the terrestrial results in a crisis precluding equilibrium praised by
both Emerson and Goethe's Wilhelm.
The balancing of the spiritual and the material by virtuous "horologes," an
Ishmaelean equilibrium, becomes Emerson's vision and the final force of his philosophy
in the later essays. He discourages absolutism and over-extension of the human mind in
"The Skeptic":
I know that human strength is not in extremes, but in avoiding extremes.
I, at least, will shun the weakness of philosophizing beyond my depth.
What is the use of pretending to assurances we have not? . . . Why be an
angel before your time? These strings, wound up too high, will snap.
(287)
Written around five years prior to Melville's composition of Pierre, this passage sounds
as if Emerson had read the work and zeroed in on the protagonist's problem. Tormented
by what he cannot know, Pierre's strings snap and Plinlimmon's warnings against being
"an angel, a chronometer" fall on deaf ears. Emerson does not explain his transition from
youthful idealism to "keep[ing] the balance" ("The Skeptic" 287). Whereas Melville's
protagonist and the philosopher both follow a path from initial insights to idealism to
skepticism, Emerson's new outlook in "Experience" evolves from the passing of time and
actual experiences, something denied young Pierre. In "The Skeptic" Emerson admires
one of Melville's favorite authors, Montaigne, who "took and kept this position of
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equilibrium" (292) and asserts that "every superior mind will pass through this domain of
equilibration" (294). Melville's affirmation of Ishmael's balanced soul and ruin of Ahab
and Pierre, unbalanced absolutists bent on attaining heavenly truth, confirm the similarity
between Melville's and Emerson's later visions: equilibrium negotiating between the
intimations of a spiritual significance and the limitations of that knowledge grounded in a
material existence.
Melville, Emerson, and Goethe affirm equilibrium as necessary for human beings
whose consciousness can tap into the infinite, but whose minds and bodies experience the
temporal, physical world. Wilhelm believes that what "keeps men in continual discontent
and agitation ... is that they cannot make realities correspond with their conceptions";
Jamo, a member of the Society of the Tower, finds that "in the conduct of poor mortals,
equilibrium cannot be restored except by contraries," the contradiction of celestial
musings and terrestrial activity (134). Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship is full of
warnings and examples of people who do not achieve such equilibrium. A minor
character in Goethe's novel addresses Pierre's problem directly: "It is always a misfortune
for him when he is induced to struggle after anything with which he cannot connect
himself by some regular exertion of his powers" (385). Pierre's struggle after heavenly
truths beyond human capabilities causes his own misfortune and that of the other
characters in the novel. Characters like Mignon and the Harper, introverted souls
estranged from society, come to tragic ends, and the characters only chasing after material
goods like Werner are held in little esteem. Wilhelm maintains a healthy, balanced
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equilibrium by experiencing the external world, contemplating his inner world, and never
being aware of a particular goal or path or directly searching for celestial truths.
The difference between Goethe's idea of equilibrium and the one espoused by
both Melville and the later Emerson is the path the individual takes. Goethe's
Bildungsroman emphasizes the path over any specific goal, allows the hero's path to
divert away from a progressive movement, and requires the passage of time for proper
insight into physical experience and spiritual truths. The process toward a perfect
harmony of terrestrial and celestial is a gradual one over time that is not privileged with
any momentary reveries or insights into the higher truths of the heavens. Melville rejects
Goethe's gradual development and employs a path closer to Emerson's, while
demonstrating its inherent flaws as well. In Emerson's series of lectures, the path to truth
is represented as almost circular, beginning with flashes of insight and intimations of
things spiritual, followed by the adoption of idealism and neglect of the material world,
eventually informed by skepticism, and concluding with the peaceful coexistence of the
unattainable realm of the infinite and an acceptance of human limitation informed by
experience. Melville's portrayal of this process in Pierre is similar to Emerson's. Pierre
glimpses intuitions of things spiritual, becomes an idealist who neglects the material
world, but ultimately confronts the elusiveness of truth and his own human inability to
grasp it with despair, depression, and suicide. Pierre takes Emerson's path and
demonstrates the inherent dangers in the "idealistic phase" for a person less optimistic
than Emerson who may see the dark side as well as the light. Melville's pseudo-
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Bildungsroman fails not only because he rejects the notion of Bildung as a gradual and
steady progression toward harmony, but also because in embracing Emerson's path
toward a balanced equilibrium, Melville's less optimistic, absolutist Pierre lacks the
balance to interpret skepticism and human limitation as "Beautiful Necessity" ("Fate"
352).
Melville and Emerson affirm similar paths and goals of healthy harmony between
the spiritual and earthly worlds and agree upon the certain spiritual significance of the
physical world and humanity's inability to grasp it. Their congruent belief in the
fundamental opposition between the belief of a philosophical ideal on the one hand and
the practice of that belief in the physical world on the other surfaces in Melville's 1857
novel, The Confidence-Man. Although Melville's attack upon Emerson's beliefs and
practices in The Confidence-Man seems a severe culmination of the overt criticism of
Emerson found in Moby-Dick and Pierre, Melville again proves himself to be more
sympathetic to Emerson's vision than a cursory reading of his works intimates.

CHAPTER III
Melville's Parody of Early Emersonian Beliefs in
The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade
"The brush between the Confidence-Man and Emerson perhaps was the nucleus around
which the rest of the story took shape in Melville's mind" (The Confidence-Man: His
Masquerade. Ed. Elizabeth S. Foster. New York: Hendricks House, Ixxix).
Just as Pierre's tragic end results from his strict adherence to the "chronometrical"
(celestial) at the expense of the "horological" (terrestrial), Melville continues his critique
of early Emersonian absolutism in his portrayal of Mark Winsome, a "mystic"
philosopher in The Confidence-Man. In 1922 Carl Van Vechten made a significant link
between Melville's text and Emersonian philosophy, proposing that Emerson was the
Confidence-Man (Higgins 285). Following a somewhat different path, Egbert S. Oliver
asserted that Melville satirized Emerson in the character of Winsome; but for Hershel
Parker "it remained for Elizabeth S. Foster to relate the mystic-and-disciple section to the
rest of the book and to prove beyond any doubt. . . that Winsome was indeed a portrait of
Emerson" (63). Affirming Mark Winsome as a portrayal of Emerson and denying
Oliver's claim that his disciple Egbert was a portrayal of Thoreau, Foster asserts that
the difference between Winsome and Egbert, however, is not so much the
difference between an originator and a disciple as between a mystic and a
practical man, between the man of theory who confines himself to words
and the man of action who puts that theory to work. (352)
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Making her case for Melville's satire of Emerson in both Winsome and Egbert, Foster
cites essays written at the height of Emerson's idealism: "Self-Reliance," "Circles,"
"Napoleon," and "Friendship." Unacknowledged by scholars and critics that otherwise
concur with Foster's evaluation is the similarity between Melville's critique of Emerson's
idealism and the mindset of an older, more mature Emerson who came to acknowledge
the practical shortcomings of his transcendental philosophy as recorded in his later
essays.
Emerson's later essays, including "Experience," "The Skeptic," and "Fate," all
written before Melville's publication of The Confidence-Man in 1857, address the
subjects of Melville's critique: absolutism, the impracticability of idealism, and the
inconsistency between the individual will and the powers of fate. Even though in 1862
Melville annotated copies of Emerson's Essays, First Series and Second Series, which
included "Self-Reliance" and "Experience," this dated annotation lends no support to his
knowledge of these essays while writing The Confidence-Man in 1857. While a published
letter from Sophia Hawthorne to Elizabeth Peabody of October 1850 records that
Melville "one morning . . . shut himself into the boudoir and read Mr. Emerson's Essays"
(Sealts 176), it is difficult to determine which collection of essays he read or which essays
from that collection he may have read. Merton Sealts' "Melville and Emerson's
Rainbow" argues that Representative Men, which included "The Skeptic," was probably
the collection Melville read at the Hawthomes' and if not on that particular morning, the
collection was at least among the books he probably read at that time (176). Whether
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Melville read any of Emerson's later essays or not, Emerson's mature vision reflects the
same concerns with absolute idealism and posits the same balance that Melville affirmed.
Splitting Emerson's philosophy into Winsome (the metaphysics) and Egbert (the
ethics) (Foster Ixxiii), Melville centers his critique of Emersonian transcendentalism
around the artificial, absolute severance of the celestial and terrestrial worlds. Through
this split he exposes the cold-hearted, inhuman self-indulgence at the heart of
transcendental philosophy, the neglect and denial of the material world, and the
impractical implementation of this philosophy in the physical world. Before criticizing
the divide between the physical and the spiritual necessitated by Emerson's philosophical
denying of the palpable world, Melville attacks Emerson's naive belief that his abstract
philosophy may be implemented in the physical world. The Confidence-Man as "the
cosmopolitan" and Mark Winsome discuss the practical applications of his philosophy,
reflecting Emerson's initial belief in a harmonious union of thought and action. The
Confidence-Man says: "You speak of a certain philosophy and a more or less occult one
it may be, and hint of its bearing upon practical life; pray, tell me, if the study of this
philosophy tends to the same formation of character with the experiences of the world?"
(170) Mark Winsome affirms the practicality of his abstract philosophy: "It does; and
that is the test of its truth; for any philosophy that, being in operation contradictory to the
ways of the world, tends to produce a character at odds with it, such a philosophy must
necessarily be but a cheat and a dream" (170). In this exchange Melville challenges
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Emerson's lectures on transcendental philosophy as both a mental, thinking exercise and
as a practical code by which to live.
Whereas Emerson's idealistic essays proclaim the congruity of transcendental
thought and action, his later essays acknowledge the essential divide between the
metaphysical thoughts of a higher realm and the reality of action in a physical existence.
In his early lecture "The American Scholar" Emerson calls for action: "Action is with the
scholar subordinate, but it is essential" (70); and the education of a scholar is "by nature,
by books, and by action" (72). "Self-Reliance" demands a "great responsible Thinker and
Actor" to break the cycle of mediocrity and shape history (154). Establishing Winsome
as the founder of a metaphysical philosophy who believes in its practical applications in
the material world, Melville satirizes Emerson's paradoxical belief that a metaphysical
philosophy that denies the existence of the physical world can have practical applications
in that material existence. Emerson's shift in vision recorded in his later essay
"Experience" acknowledges the same philosophical shortcomings for which Melville
accused him. After years of experience living in the world, Emerson acquiesces: "But I
have not found that much was gained by manipular attempts to realize the world of
thought" ("Experience" 273). He finally concedes the incongruity of metaphysical
thought and practical action, a division which his idealistic philosophy necessitates. A
result of the division of thought and action, Emerson's necessary adherence to the
idealistic and neglect of the material prompts an even more scathing critique from
Melville.
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Melville demonstrates that applying Winsome's philosophy requires a denial and
neglect of the material world, an act that has consequences for the individual and society.
Privileging a healthy equilibrium and rewarding characters who negotiate between the
spiritual and physical worlds on an even keel, Melville portrays the physical
consequences of an individual's excessive metaphysical reveries and disregard for the
material world. Not only could a man fall off the mast-head and drown during a
prolonged transcendental reverie in Moby-Dick, but also Starbuck's unwavering belief in
the Christian God prevents him from intervening with Ahab's monomaniac quest, costing
him his life and the lives of most of the Pequod's crew. Pierre also suffers at the hands of
debtors and angry familial and social acquaintances for neglecting important material
considerations of the tangible world. Devoting all of his time and energy to his search for
celestial truths, he pays for dismissing social reality with his own life, his mother's,
Lucy's and Isabelle's.
Emerson's later essays address the dangers of absolutism and aver Melville's
vision of individual equilibrium. Gary Lindberg posits Emerson as the immediate target
of Melville's critique in The Confidence-Man, distinguishing between the primary and
secondary or the inner and outer selves:
Severed from the circumstantial world of human relations, the inward self
becomes blandly vague and uncertain, like the utterances of Mark
Winsome, or it may fall into dangerous obsessions, unchecked by an
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acknowledgement of human limitations and frailty—Ahab and Colonel
Moredock. (38)
As Ahab obsessively identifies all evil with Moby Dick, Colonel Moredock, the Indian
killer, obsessively identifies all evil with Indians. In "The Skeptic" Emerson proposes a
"third party to occupy the middle ground between [the abstractionist and the materialist],
the skeptic, namely" ("The Skeptic 286). Emerson leaves behind the absolutism of the
categories of the "idealists" and the "materialists" from his earlier essay "The
Transcendentalist," giving up his own self-portrait as an idealist who must, as a
consequence, deny the existence of the material world. Just like Melville's vision of
equilibrium, Emerson's skeptic "finds both wrong by being in extremes" and "labors to
plant his feet, to be the beam of the balance" (286-87). In a self-critique of his former
absolutism, Emerson acknowledges the dangers inherent in incessantly aspiring to the
unattainable truth, a danger Melville portrays in Ahab, Pierre, and Col. Moredock.
Although Melville criticizes the effects of an absolute Emersonian idealism on the
individual, his central target in The Confidence-Man is the effects such philosophy has on
society at large.
Melville illustrates the social ramifications of Emersonian philosophy devoid of
practical applications in a neglected physical world and its effects on society at large in
The Confidence-Man. Placing Emerson's philosophy in the mouth of Mark Winsome and
setting it on the Fidele, Melville represents American society so that the consequences of
such practices assume a grander scale than the crew of the Pequod or a single social circle
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in Pierre. All of the passengers on board practice a "nominal Christianity" affected by
the enlightened self-interest preached by Emerson in 1Q111 century America. As none of
the passengers is eager to act as true Christians and give money to philanthropic causes
and believe in the goodness of their fellow human beings, the effects of Emerson's
rejection of philanthropic practices on American society are easily observable.
Unfortunately, each "enlightened" passenger is vulnerable to the Confidence-Man,
demonstrating how evil can more easily operate in such a society that ignores social
reality. By neglecting social interaction, the stage is set for swindlers, con men and the
devil incarnate, the Confidence-Man. Ultimately, Emerson's disciples, each passenger
with whom the Confidence-Man interacts, demonstrate their nai've ignorance of evil and
their vulnerability caused by neglecting the material world. Melville represents the
effects of Emerson's philosophy on American society that allows evil swindlers to run
free unchecked by a society that ignores society itself.
Lindberg supports my view that Emerson's philosophy promotes a social
atmosphere conducive to the Confidence-Man's success: "The philosophical cult of the
innermost man coexists with its complement, a practical cult that celebrates pure,
disengaged outward manipulation, and the Confidence-Man is its unacknowledged hero"
(43). The Confidence-Man, who manifests his identity through social interaction alone,
derives his identity from Emerson's disregard for society. As long as "enlightened"
Emersonian disciples ignore the social context of identity through human interaction, a
Confidence-Man will remain free to manipulate others. Lindberg posits Emerson's
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philosophy as the catalyst for the Confidence-Man's success, acknowledging a direct
relationship of interdependence.
Melody Graulich takes the relationship between Emerson and the ConfidenceMan a step further and suggests that the Confidence-Man observes deceptive attributes
similar to his own in Mark Winsome/Emerson:
Through his use of the fascinating rattlesnake, he implies that Emerson
himself is a con man, not simply because of his cold, selfish heart and
shallow optimism (though these are traits shared by various avatars of the
confidence man), but because he too inspires and even elicits a misplaced
trust.. . .(230)
Both the Confidence-Man and Emerson's transcendental philosophy blind men to
"humanity's essential vulnerability," making them equal partners in manipulation (230).
Emerson sets the stage by arguing that human nature is benign and society can be ignored,
and the Confidence-Man easily snatches people's souls from them. I concur with
Graulich and find similarities between the Confidence-Man as head of the Philosophical
Intelligence Office and Emerson. Convincing the skeptical man that all boys, even badly
behaved boys, are good at heart, the Confidence-Man echoes Emerson's nai've belief that
all nature is essentially good as documented in his early essays. A closer study of
similarities between Emerson and the Confidence-Man in various disguises could be
fertile ground for future research.
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Neglecting social responsibilities and instigating an environment ripe for con men
is the necessary social consequence of a philosophy that espouses not only a disregard for
social existence, but the denial of any actual material world. At the height of his idealism
Emerson asserts in the "The Transcendentalist" that the "mind is the only reality, of
which men and all other natures are better or worse reflectors" (194). In such a world that
does not exist outside of the mind, human beings shouldn't feel any sense of
responsibility to the outside world and be forced to act charitably to it:
Expect me not to show cause why I seek or why I exclude company. Then
again, do not tell me, as a good man did today, of my obligation to put all
poor men in good situations. Are they my poor? I tell thee, thou foolish
philanthropist, that I grudge the dollar, the dime, the cent I give to such
men as do not belong to me and to whom I do not belong. . . . though I do
confess with shame I sometimes succumb and give the dollar, it is a
wicked dollar, which by and by I shall have the manhood to withhold.
("Self-Reliance" 150)
The "wicked dollar" Emerson gives to charity echoes the exchange of souls to the devil
by "the philanthropist" in The Confidence-Man. Emerson's denial of any responsible
action in the material world and his ignorance of any evil in that world leave him as
vulnerable to Melville's critique as Winsome's followers are to the evil rhetoric of the
Confidence-Man.
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Winsome practices Emerson's disregard for the material world, revealing an
inconsistency between the human application of his metaphysical philosophy and his
theory of correspondences between the natural and spiritual world. As a "crazy beggar
asking alms under the form of peddling a rhapsodical tract" approaches Winsome, he "sat
more like a cold prism than ever ... his whole air said 'Nothing from me'" (167). The
Confidence-Man's reproach, "you ought to have sympathized with that man; tell me, did
you feel no fellow-feeling? Look at this tract here, quite in the transcendental vein"
(167), only provokes Winsome to reveal the ultimate inconsistency in the practical
application of his own philosophy: "I detected in him, sir, a damning peep of sense—
damning, I say; for sense in a seeming madman is scoundrelism. I take him for a cunning
vagabond, who picks up a vagabond living by adroitly playing the madman" (168).
Melville cleverly exposes the contradictory nature of Emerson's own practice in life, his
practical monetary compensation for selling transcendental tracts and by "playing the
madman" who "to the men of practical power ... the man of ideas appears out of his
reason" ("The Skeptic" 285). Refusing to patronize his own double in the narrative
because the "sense" of the mind of the "vagabond" did not correspond to his outward
appearance as a "madman," Winsome exemplifies Emerson's refusal to practice
philanthropy. Melville mocks Emerson's limited theory of correspondences, in which the
direct correlation between object and spirit can be observed in all of nature except in
human beings.
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Mark Winsome's philosophy concerning the outward appearances or "labels" on
people and creatures both affirms the reliability of labels of creatures and challenges their
validity in human beings. In reference to the rattlesnake, Winsome asserts, "When any
creature is by its make inimical to other creatures, nature in effect labels that creature,
much as an apothecary does a poison," implying the reliability of outward labels and a
transparent relationship between an object and its spiritual significance obvious to any
transcendentalist observer (163). Referring to the cosmopolitan's recently departed
acquaintance, Winsome contradicts his earlier statement: "Nobody knows who anybody
is. The data which life furnishes, toward forming a true estimate of being, are as
insufficient to that end as in geometry one side given would be to determine the triangle"
(165). The Confidence-Man astutely accuses the philosopher's beliefs in both labels and
his "doctrine of triangles" or the indeterminacy of meaning in physical objects as
inconsistent. Emerson's theory of correspondences must be inherently flawed if it applies
only to the natural world, which includes all inanimate objects and animate creatures in
nature and does not account for human beings. Espousing the theory of correspondences,
Emerson's transcendental philosophy requires only humanity to be blind, cold, and
unengaged on the surface in order to align the spirit with a higher truth. Winsome's
insistence that the rattlesnake, the symbol of evil, has a label that determines his certain
true significance, but that a human cannot be so easily judged, makes him vulnerable to
Melville's criticism of inconsistency and the denial of evil.

59

Able to see less and less of the direct correlation of natural objects to their
spiritual significance, Emerson concedes the limitations of his theory of correspondences
and recognizes the existence of evil in his later essay "Experience." Amending his
contention in "Nature" that "spiritual facts are represented by natural symbols," Emerson
concedes the opacity of his former transparent world and demonstrates the weaknesses of
his theory: "The new molecular philosophy shows astronomical interspaces betwixt atom
and atom, shows that the world is all outside; it has no inside" ("Experience" 263). He
doesn't suggest that a correspondence does not exist, but that human beings are not privy
to that knowledge; he would be "very content with knowing, if only [he] could know"
("Experience" 273). Since the object in nature Mark Winsome identifies as spiritually
labeled is a rattlesnake, the analogue for evil or the devil, Melville's criticism of Emerson
includes his denial of evil in the world. In "Experience" Emerson awakes to find "the
dear old devil not far off (262-3), admits that "Nature, as we know her, is no saint," and
remarks on the "objective existence" of "essential evil" (271), demonstrating his later
acknowledgement of evil in the world.
In response to the inconsistencies Emerson's philosophy raised at the height of his
idealistic vision, Melville questions the fundamental human ability to attain spiritual
truth. The Confidence-Man questions Winsome's inconsistency in his alternate doctrines
on "labels" for natural objects and the indeterminacy of human identity based on outward
appearances. Winsome responds to the Confidence Man's confusion: "I seldom care to
be consistent," blames the hill and dale of nature, and asks "how can one keep naturally
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advancing in knowledge without submitting to the natural inequalities in the progress?"
(165) Winsome's comment refers to Emerson's statement in "Self-Reliance" that
A foolish consistency is the hobglobin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has
simply nothing to do. . . . Speak what you think now in hard words and
tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, though it
contradict every thing you said today.—"Ah, so you shall be
misunderstood."—Is it so bad then to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was
misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus ... To be great is to be
misunderstood. (153)
Not only is Winsome "misunderstood" by the Confidence-Man, but the Confidence-Man
accuses him of not saying anything concrete at all and more deceptively "bewitching"
him with refined rhetorical skills. In response to the philosopher's analogy between the
ups and downs of knowledge prone to natural progress and the locks of the Eerie canal,
the Confidence-Man challenges him: "For, after all these weary lockings-up and lockingsdown, upon how much of a higher plain do you finally stand? Enough to make it an
object? . . . you someway bewitch me with your tempting discourse" (165). The stab at
Emerson reveals the impracticability of chasing after elusive truths in the physical world
and criticizes the unintelligibility of his discourse, a usual attack against the
Transcendentalist circle. If such truth is eventually unattainable as Melville believes, no
reason remains to ignore the physical world.

Emerson's significant change in vision, also recorded in his essays entitled "The
Skeptic" and "Fate," reflects a change in attitude toward the dangers of chasing after an
elusive truth at the expense of the physical world. Because his intuitions become less
transparent and less frequent, Emerson concedes the existence of the material world and
no longer sees life as an escape from physical reality to a higher truth, but as experiencing
the surfaces of the material world and accepting the unintelligibility of the celestial or
spiritual realm. Recognizing both the physical and inner world, he proposes the solution
of a "double consciousness" and believes that "a man must ride alternately on the horses
of his private and his public nature" ("Fate" 351). Leaving the elusive spiritual truths
behind, Emerson suggests a physically active life based on what humanity can know with
certainty:
Let us go abroad; let us mix in affairs; let us learn and get and have and
climb. "Men are a sort of moving plants, and, like trees, receive a great
part of their nourishment from the air. If they keep too much at home,
they pine." Let us have a robust, manly life; let us know what we know,
for certain; what we have, let it be solid and seasonable and our own. A
world in the hand is worth two in the bush. Let us have to do with real
men and women, and not with skipping ghosts. ("The Skeptic" 288-9)
Instead of supporting a philosophy of thought wherein the practical application requires a
neglect of society as the early essays did, Emerson's new vision marries thought and
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action, the celestial and the terrestrial, in a balanced equilibrium that Melville would
surely affirm.
Emerson's shift from idealistic absolutism to skeptical equilibrium affected his
conception of the power of the individual and the power of fate. The early Emerson of
"Self-Reliance" deemed all possible by individual will alone, whereas the later Emerson
of "Fate" found that "in its loftiest ascensions, insight itself and the freedom of the will is
one of its obedient members" (339). The same shift occurs in Egbert's philosophy in The
Confidence-Man, presenting the possibility that Melville may have been familiar with
both "Self-Reliance" and at least the fatalistic passages of "The Skeptic" if not with the
essay "Fate," in which his changing vision is more completely expounded. While the
Confidence-Man and Egbert assume the characters of Frank and Charlie, respectively,
they engage in the hypothetical discussion of a friend in need, Frank, who wants to
borrow money from his friend Charlie, who flatly refuses based on the philosophy of
Mark Winsome. The Confidence-Man, or Frank begs: "O Charlie! You talk not to a god,
a being who in himself holds his own estate, but to a man who, being a man, is the sport
of fate's wind and wave, and who mounts towards heaven or sinks towards hell, as the
billows roll him trough or on crest." To which Charlie, or Egbert replies: "Tut! Frank.
Man is no such poor devil as that comes to—no poor drifting sea-weed of the universe.
Man has a soul; which, if he will, puts him beyond fortune's finger and the future's spite.
Don't whine like fortune's whipped dog, Frank ..

(176). Identical to Emerson's

philosophy in "Self-Reliance" in which the individual will can control fate and is like a
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god, Egbert's strict adherence to Winsome's philosophy reflects Emerson's vision at the
height of his idealism. To explain the dangers of lending money to a celestial friend,
Egbert or Charlie tells the story of China Aster, a candle-maker whose ruin comes from
taking money from a friend, who initially does not wish to be repaid and eventually
collects the principle and interest on the "loan." Before telling this story, Egbert will not
give his celestial friend a loan, because one must keep business out of celestial
friendships and true celestial intercourse out of business friendships. Keeping the
celestial and terrestrial separate is the philosophy behind his refusal to lend money to his
dear, true, celestial friend.
After telling the story of China Aster, Egbert will not lend his friend money due to
the potential mutability of character, representative of Emerson's change in belief from
individual will to the power of fate. Egbert now maintains that one may borrow money
from a friend one trusts, but the difference between a man who would collect interest and
take the mortgaged homestead "is not so great a difference between what the same man
be to-day and what he maybe in the days to come" (191). Basically, a man's nature may
change from "some chance tip of Fate's elbow in throwing her dice" (191). At the
suggestion of fate's interference, the Confidence-Man accuses Winsome's practical
disciple Egbert (in the guise of Charlie) of espousing inconsistent ideas of free will and
fate:
But Charlie, dear Charlie, what new notions are these? I thought that man
was no poor drifting weed of the universe, as you phrased it; that, if so
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minded, he could have a will, a way, a thought, and a heart of his own.
But now you have turned everything upside down again, with an
inconsistency that amazes and shocks me. (191)
Egbert's change from a belief in man's self-determination and free will to a world
determined by fate elucidates the change in Emerson's philosophic vision between such
works as "Self-Reliance," written at the height of his idealism, and later works like "The
Skeptic," written with a diminished idealistic tone from the perspective of experience.
Since Melville could easily have been acquainted with the central idea of "SelfReliance" without actually having read the essay, and since Merton Sealts believes that
Melville may have read "The Skeptic" at the Hawthomes' in 1850, a closer look at the
change in vision represented in these two works is useful. A drastic displacement of
"Self-Reliance," his most individualistic essay in which the human will alone determines
history, "The Skeptic" records Emerson's acceptance of humanity's limited power:
We have too little power of resistance against this ferocity which champs
us up. What front can we make against these unavoidable, victorious,
maleficent forces? What can I do against the influence of Race, in my
history? What can I do against hereditary and constitutional habits;
against scrofula, lymph, impotence? Against climate, against barbarism, in
my country? (297)
No longer assured of the invincible power of individual will and self-determination,
Emerson gives full credit to the powers of fate, heredity, and history, just as Egbert does.
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Emerson's views on the power of fate come to fruition in his later essay "Fate" in which
he encourages humanity to "build altars to the Beautiful Necessity," (352) necessity that
is alterable only by human thought or power: "If Fate follows and limits Power, Power
attends and antagonizes Fate" (339). However small a role power or human thought
usually plays in life, when exerted it can alter the course of history. Emerson's belief in
fate also alters his early enlightened self-interest to a less selfish harmony with other
human beings and the universe: "When souls reach a certain clearness of perception they
accept a knowledge and motive above selfishness. A breath of will blows eternally
through the universe of souls in the direction of the Right and Necessary" (342). This
lingering belief in the order behind a benign universe still differs from Melville's belief in
a more ambiguous deity.
The cause of Emerson's change in philosophic vision from the all-powerful
human will to the powers of fate, from the certain knowledge of the spiritual realm to an
acknowledgement of the human incapacity to attain spiritual truth, and from the neglect
of the material world to an affirmation of the physical realm is portrayed by Egbert in
Melville's The Confidence-Man as the result of the experience of a narrative. Telling the
story and indirectly experiencing the dim fate of China Aster causes Egbert to reconsider
the motives for not lending his friend the money he requires. After turning over "day and
night, with indefatigable pains, the sublime pages of [his] master," Egbert concludes that
"in this matter the experience of China Aster teaches a moral more to the point than
anything Mark Winsome can offer, or I either" (191). It is experience, not written,
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abstract philosophy, that is the true teacher. And it is the experience of telling China
Aster's story that changes Egbert's philosophical vision. As Emerson's real experience in
the world teaches him to look to the predetermined powers of fate, Egbert's secondary
experience of China Aster's story alters his former idealistic belief in the power of human
will and prompts him to accept the inevitability of the power of fate.
Whether or not Melville was familiar with Emerson's later essays, I believe the
older, more mature Emerson would have agreed with Melville's critique of his former
unchecked idealism. Melville satirizes young Emerson's conviction that thought and
action combine in his practical metaphysical philosophy; the older Emerson writing
"Experience" acknowledges the discrepancy between thought and action and the
impracticability of most thoughts. Melville critiques Emerson's early uncompromising
divide between the celestial and terrestrial worlds, privileging all things spiritual at the
expense of all things material and even denying the existence of the physical world
outside the mind. The Emerson who wrote "The Skeptic" can "reason down or deny
every thing, except [his] perpetual belly" (297), recognizing not only the existence and
significance of physical reality, but the limited access human beings have to spiritual
knowledge. The late Emersonian vision of the skeptic who occupies the middle ground
between idealists and materialists is the embodiment of Melville's ideal hero who
maintains an equilibrium between the reality of this world and the one beyond.

CONCLUSION
While most critics ignore the relationship between Melville's vision and
Emerson's later essays, at least two critics do cite his later essays to further prove the
disparity between them. Matthiessen argues that Melville highlights the conception of
fate in Moby-Dick as part of his reaction against Emerson's later essay "Fate." He argues
that Ahab represents Emerson's thinking man who is bound in the eternal without
knowing so: "So far as a man thinks, he is free." Since Melville takes Emerson's
thinking man connected to fate and the eternal and has him destroy his crew, Matthiessen
concludes that the author is mocking Emerson's philosophical assumptions about fate.
Emerson takes for granted that humankind will accept a motive above selfishness and
inevitably align itself with the Right and Necessary ("Fate" 342). He also allows thought
an elastic capacity to change the course of fate, more tame yet still reminiscent of "SelfReliance." Certainly Emerson's lingering belief in a benevolent universe is at odds with
Melville's more ambiguous one, but Emerson's change in belief reflects a more
Melvillian acknowledgement of human limitation. Admitting that the individual is at the
mercy of powers greater than himself or herself, Emerson steps closer to Melville as a
"puller-down."
Milton R. Stem's "Melville, Society and Language" shows the disparity between
the realistic goals of Transcendentalism and its lingering idealism, one he believes
remained to the end. Although the movement insisted on the "physical, the experiential.
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the quotidian, 'the meal in the firkin; the milk in the pan' (Emerson, "American Scholar"
61)" the emphasis on realism acquiesced to idealism to the end: "For all that Emerson
insisted on 'Experience,' and wrestled with 'Fate' and 'Montaigne,' with illusion and the
'lords of life,' he relocated, but did not abandon, a certitude about universal Divine
purpose" (436). This statement does not contrast with Melville, who never abandoned
certitude about the universal Divine purpose, but simply did not know whether that force
was belligerent or benign. Acknowledging a Divine purpose is not equivalent to
idealism, nor is it excluded from realism. Stem goes on to argue that for Melville
"realism" did not leave him with "the philosophical escape hatch of the
Transcendentalists" out of the world of despair into an idealistic paradise (437). But that
escape hatch was all but closed for the Emerson who proposed that we "have to do with
real men and women, and not with skipping ghosts" ("The Skeptic" 289). The older
Emerson can finally be read as a Melvillian realist with a little more faith in goodness.
The tempering of young idealism with the skepticism brought about by age and
experience was a phenomenon Emerson shared with many European thinkers, including
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The excessive introversion of his protagonist at odds with
the physical world portrayed in his 1774 Sufferings of Young Werther differs greatly from
his more conservative, more mature work of 1795-6, Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship.
The most important connection between the mature Goethe, the mature Emerson, and
Melville is their shared belief in equilibrium. Maintaining a balance between the material
and spiritual worlds transforms Goethe into a Classicist and allows for a more realistic

understanding of Melville and the later Emerson. Just as Goethe is still regarded as a
Romantic outside of Germany, Emerson's name is still synonymous with idealistic
transcendentalism, despite his mature, conservative leanings. It is no surprise, then, that
Melville's realism continues to be pitted against Emerson's "transcendentalism," and that
Melville associated Goethe with his Romantic idealism and criticized him for it.
Similar to his ambivalent response to Emerson, Melville felt both drawn to
Goethe and repelled by his idealistic philosophy. Melville equates Goethe's phrase, "live
in the all," to the transcendental loss of identity in the multiplicity as described in "The
Mast-Head" chapter of Moby-Dick. Discussing Goethe's phrase in a letter to Hawthorne,
June, 1851, Melville satirizes Goethe's concept:
That is to say, your separate identity is but a wretched one,—good; but get
out of yourself, spread and expand yourself, and bring to yourself the
tinglings of life that are felt in the flowers and the wood, that are felt in the
planet Saturn and Venus, and the Fixed Stars. What nonsense! Here is a
fellow with a raging toothache. "My dear boy," Goethe says to him, "you
are sorely afflicted with that tooth; but you must live in the all, and then
you will be happy!" As with all great genius there is an immense deal of
flummery in Goethe, and in proportion to my own contact with him, a
monstrous deal of it in me. (Correspondence 193-94)

Although Melville attacks Goethe's position, he admits the influence Goethe's
philosophy has had on him, even if it is "flummery." Melville changes his sarcastic tone
and gives Goethe credit for his "live in the all" feeling in the postscript of the letter:
This "all" feeling, though, there is some truth in. You must often have felt
it, lying on the grass on a warm summer's day. Your legs seem to send out
shoots into the earth. Your hair feels like leaves upon your head. This is
the all feeling. But what plays the mischief with the truth is that men will
insist upon the universal application of a temporary feeling or opinion.
(<Correspondence 194)
Like Melville's ambiguous reaction to Emersonian idealism, in which he was both drawn
to his "diving" and repelled by his arrogance and anti-social behavior, Melville finds
merit in Goethe's idealistic phrase and recognizes its shortcomings and inherent dangers.
The "universal application of a temporary feeling of opinion" is exactly what Melville
demonstrates in Ahab and Pierre, what most critics have termed his "antitranscendentalism." Connecting Goethe and Emerson to Platonic idealism and criticizing
them for their shared philosophy, Melville misses the congruity of his own vision with the
later Emerson and later Goethe. They all eventually come to appreciate the balance of
celestial truths and material reality in a calm, mature equilibrium.
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